The author argues that pragmatism and interest to it in the society was first of all a result of reaction at the ‘rationalistic formalism’ in philosophy; under that term the author understood the replacement of the meaning of an idea with its form. At that, critics often saw subjectivity, skepticism, and even nihilism in pragmatism – and that did not correspond to the reality. Opposite to skepticism and nihilism, indifferent to these or those manifestations of human thought, pragmatism stressed their unique value.
Pragmatism is not a philosophic trend as it is, which could be the basement of a new school; and, on the point of view of K., it was a method and a guideline for the common sense. At that, there was an important basement for pragmatism, which did not provide it with a soil of dogmatic impeccability. First of all, it was an appeal to its principal tolerance. The author argued, that the state democratic basics of the domestic politic could be a fundament for the civic rights. Pragmatism was not limited with a criticism of monism; it tried to take off all its prerequisites; it declared the variety of the world and human feelings. Pragmatism was a golden middle between the skeptical indifference and fanatic orthodoxy.